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Proposed COPV Ground Processing Requirements 
Revised COPV Ground Processing Requirements based on the Feb 8 2011 Composite Pressure 
Vessel Ground Processing Safety Requirements TIM at KSC. 
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN, TEST, AND GROUND PROCESSING OF 
FLIGHT COMPOSITE OVERWRAPPED PRESSURE VESSELS (COPVs) AT THE KENNEDY 
SPACE CENTER (KSC 
a. The hardware provider shall verify that the design, qualification , and acceptance testing of the 
COPV-complies with the requirements of ANSI/American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
(AIAA) S-081 Space Systems-Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) or another 
industry recognized standard for COPVs. 
b. Prior to the first pressurization of a COPV at KSC an inspection of the vessel for visible damage 
shall be performed by a trained inspector. The trained inspector" skills shall be comparable to a Le'lel 
II visual inspector, per the American Society for Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) Recommended 
Practice No. SNT TC 1A (see ANSI/AlA/\ S 081A 2006, Paragraph 5.5.3). The Inspector must be 
trained in the specific inspection of COPV's. This training must address the types of damage that can 
occur the effects of that damage, and disposition of damage indications. Currently this training is 
conducted by NASA White Sands Test Facility. 
Definition of Trained Inspector: (COPV) -A person trained specifically in the detection 
of visual damage of COPVs and familiarized with the NDE methods and results that could be 
used to aid in the interpretation of visual damage. White Sands Test Facility typically conducts 
this training as part of their COPV damage control and inspection course. 
(JBH Note We have not yet been able to create wording that would could apply both to NASA 
and non NASA Aerospace companies) 
If this inspection is not possible at the launch site (i.e. COPV is not accessible}, then it shall be 
conducted the last time the COPV is accessible for inspection. 
c. The Mechanical Damage Control Plan (MDCP) for the COPV shall be provided by the hardware 
provider and made available for review by the applicable KSC safety organization . This COPV 
damage control plan shall evaluate and mitigate the threats during shipping and handling, assembly 
level integration, ground processing, and launch vehicle integration. Guidance for a COPV MDCP are 
in AIAA-S-081 and NASA Memo ES4-1 0-021 Damage Control Plan Template for Composite 
Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 
Proposed COPV Ground Processing Requirements 
d. (JBH note As an action from the Feb 8 2011 TIM, Lorie Grimes-Ledesma and I reviewed the 1994 
Amos Alexander memo justifying the 1.1 test and the Annex B document. We issued a memo stating 
"Given the above it was our opinion that there is no longer sufficient reason to keep the 1.1 
pressurization test requirement in future NASA COPV ground safety requirements.") 
e. If COPVs are to be pressurized at KSC to pressures greater than one third of the COPVs design burst 
pressure, the pressurizations shall be performed remotely, ensuring ground personnel safety or a blast shield 
shall be used to protect personnel. If the vessel is to remain pressurized , personnel access shall not be 
permitted to the area for at least ten (10) minutes after pressurization is completed. 
f. Personnel limits for each operation on or near the COPV shall be established to minimize personnel 
exposure to the pressurized tank when at pressures greater than one third design burst pressure. If the COPV 
is pressurized above 1/3 design burst, the safety clear distance during pressurization and the post 
pressurization personnel access controls shall be determined by a COPV blast/fragmentation analysis. 
g. The transport of pressurized COPVs at pressures greater than one third design burst pressure shall be 
along routes that minimize exposure to personnel and facilities with escort during designated "off-shift" time 
periods. 
h. Hardware providers shall develop Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) that include contingency safing and 
backout plans for COPVs. The ERPs shall consider leaks, impact damage to the COPV that requires 
immediate action , and exposure to hazardous materials including graphite fibers if applicable. If 
implemented , a real-time assessment shall be accomplished and contingency operations taken as required. 
The ERP shall be approved prior to the start of ground operations by the applicable NASA Safety 
organization . 
PROPOSED GROUND PROCESSING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
FOR DESIGN, TEST, AND GROUND PROCESSING OF COMPOSITE 
PRESSURIZED STRUCTURE (CPS) AT THE KENNEDY SPACE 
CENTER (KSC) 
Proposed CPS Ground Processing Requirements 
a. The CPS provider shall provide to the appropriate KSC safety organization either 
1) documentation verifying that that the design, qualification, and acceptance testing of the CPS complies with the 
requirements of the current relevant Industry standard or code, such as ANSI/American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (AIAA) S-089 Space Systems- Composite Pressurized Structure (CPS) when released. 
or 2) documentation verifying the CPS meets another recognized relevant industry standard such as MIL-STD 
1522A 
or 3) state the CPS does not meet any recognized industry standard for CPS and provide as a minimum the following 
documentation 
Damage Control Plan including storage and transportation requirements 
Minimum design burst value. Provide burst test data validating the minimum design burst value 
MEOP based on an analysis of the operational scenarios at KSC. 
Assumed factor of safety based on stress ratio or pressure ratio ( MDP/ MEOP) 
Any MRB actions 
Composite Visual Inspection with NDE reports with adverse results 
Blast Analysis (if to be pressurized above 1/3 design burst pressure). If the CPS is to be pressurized above 1/3 design burst, provide recommended personnel access 
restrictions and safety clears based on a blast/fragmentation analysis. 
Complete safety data package containing all the above plus any other safety related relevant CPS provider documentation such as an (Operation and Configuration 
Control Plan. 
System Specifications: 
Internal Volume: XXX liters 
Rated fluids: XXX, plus all inert gases and nitrogen 
Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP): XXXX psia 
Maximum Design Pressure (MDP): XXX psia 
Proof Pressure Factor of Safety: XXX 
Proof Pressure: XXX psia 
Design Burst Pressure Rating: XXX psia 
Qualification Burst Pressure: XXX psia 
Proposed CPS Ground Processing Requirements 
b. Prior to the first pressurization of a CPS at KSC an inspection of the vessel for visible 
damage shall be performed by a trained inspector. The trained inspecto(l skills shall be 
comparable to a Level II visual inspector, per the American Society for Nondestructive Testing 
(ASNT) Recommended Practice No. SNT TC 1A (see ANSI/AIMS 081A 2006, Paragraph 
5.5.3). The Inspector must be trained in the specific inspection of CPSs. This training must 
address the types of damage that can occur the effects of that damage, and disposition of 
damage indications. Currently this training is conducted by NASA White Sands Test Facility. 
Add Definition of Trained Inspector: (CPS) A person trained specifically in the detection 
of visual damage of CPSs and familiarized with the NDE methods and results that could be 
used to aid in the interpretation of visual damage. White Sands Test Facility typically conducts 
this training as part of their CPSs damage control and inspection course. 
(JBH note WSTF may teach an updated COPV damage control and inspection course or 
an addendum covering CPS inspection) 
(JBH Note We have not yet been able to create wording that would could apply both to 
NASA and non NASA Aerospace companies) 
If this inspection is not possible at the launch site (i.e. the CPS is not accessible), then it shall 
be conducted the last time the CPS is accessible for inspection. 
Proposed CPS Ground Processing Requirements 
c. If CPSs are to be pressurized at the KSC to pressures greater than one third of the 
CPS design burst pressure or loaded to more than 1/3 the CPS limit load, the 
pressurizations/loading shall be performed remotely or a blast shield shall be used to 
protect personnel. The personnel access restrictions and blast shield design must be 
validated by a blast/fragmentation analysis that considers all possible CPS rupture 
energy source contributors. Pressurization of cryogenic/liquid gases shall evaluate the 
possibility of a boiling or BLEVE in the event of pressure vessel rupture. If the vessel is 
to remain pressurized, personnel access shall not be permitted to the area for at least 
ten (10) minutes after pressurization is completed. 
d. If propellants and other reactive commodities are to be used with a CPS with no 
liner, the hardware provider shall provide data on the compatibility testing and 
analysis of the composite and commodity for the possible range of pressures and 
temperatures encountered during ground processing and storage. 
e. Personnel limits for each operation on or near the CPS shall be 
established to minimize personnel exposure to the pressurized tank when at pressures 
greater than one third design burst pressure or loaded to more than 1/3 the CPS limit 
load, based on an appropriate blast/fragmentation or an appropriate QD siting 
analysis. 
Proposed CPS Ground Processing Requirements 
f. The transport of pressurized CPSs at pressures greater than one third design burst 
pressure shall be along routes that minimize exposure to personnel and facilities with escort 
during designated "off-shift" time periods. 
g. The Mechanical Damage Control Plan (MDCP) for the CPS shall be provided by the 
hardware provider and made available for review by the applicable KSC Safety organization. 
This CPS damage control plan shall evaluate and mitigate the threats during shipping and 
handling, assembly level integration, ground processing, and launch vehicle integration. 
Guidance for a COPV MDCP is in NASA Memo ES4-XX-xxx Damage Control Plan Template for 
Composite Pressurized Structures and AIAA S-089 Space Systems- Composite Pressurized 
Structure (CPS). 
h. If propellants and other reactive commodities are to be used with a CPS without a metal 
liner, the hardware provider shall provide data on the compatibility testing and analysis of the 
composite and commodity for the possible range of pressures and temperatures encountered 
during ground processing and storage. 
i. Hardware providers or users shall develop Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) that include 
contingency sating and backout plans for CPSs. The ERPs shall consider leaks, impact 
damage to the CPS that requires immediate action, and exposure to hazardous materials 
including graphite fibers if applicable. If implemented, a real-time assessment shall be 
accomplished and contingency operations taken as required. The ERP shall be approved prior 
to the start of ground operations by the applicable NASA Safety organization. 
